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RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
EXTENSION OF ATTRACTIVE NUISANCE DOCTRINE
TO REASONABLY FORESEEABLE
DANGEROUS CONDITIONS
Menneti v. Evans Construction Co.,
259 F.2d 367 (3d Cir. 1958)
A seven year old boy was drowned in a rain filled ditch while
trespassing on the defendant's land. The ditch, located in a low spot,
had been excavated for the defendant five days prior to the fatal acci-
dent and was in the process of being refilled when heavy rains halted
the project. Without the knowledge of the defendant or its employees,
the ditch filled with water less than thirty hours before the drowning.
Defendant was held liable under the theory set forth in the Restatement
of Torts' for maintaining a ditch which it should have foreseen would
fill with rain water as it ran off from higher surrounding land.
The early common law treated a trespassing child as if he were
an adult, allowing recovery only when the landowner would be liable
to an adult trespasser.2 The first recognition of any liability of the
possessor of the land came in 1873 when the United States Supreme
Court held a railroad liable for the injury which a six year old child
sustained while playing on an unguarded turntable left unlocked on
the railroad's land.' The name "attractive nuisance" came from an-
other turntable case in which the court drew an analogy of children
being attracted to the turntable as a piece of stinking meat draws a dog.4
The Restatement devoted a section5 to this development in the
common law in an effort to bring some uniformity into the many
1 RESTATEMENT, TORTS § 339 (1934). "A possessor of land is subject to
liability for bodily harm to young children trespassing thereon caused by a
structure or other artificial condition which he maintains upon the land, if (a) the
place where the condition is maintained is one upon which the possessor knows
or should know that such children are likely to trespass, and (b) the condition is
one of which the possessor knows or should know and which he realizes or
should realize as involving an unreasonable risk of death or serious bodily harm
to such children, and (c) the children because of their youth do not discover the
condition or realize the risk involved in intermeddling in it or in coming within
the area made dangerous by it, and (d) the utility to the possessor of maintaining
the condition is slight as compared to the risk to young children involved therein."
2 HARPER & JAMES, TORTS: § 27.5, at 1447 (1956); PROSSER, TORTS § 76, at
438 (2d ed. 1955); Green, Landowner 'v. Intruder; Intruder 'V. Lando'wner,
21 MicH. L. REV. 495 (1923) ; James, Tort Liability of Occupiers of Land: Duties
O'wed to Trespassers, 63 YALE L.J. 144 (1953).
3 Railroad Co. v. Stout, 84 U.S. (17 Wall.) 657 (1873).
4 Keffe v. Milwaukee & St. P. Ry., 21 Minn. 207 (1875).
5 Supra note 1.
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conflicts among, and at times within, the states.6 The Restatement
theory of liability has received general acceptance throughout the
country7 and has been adopted by eight states in cases concerning the
drowning of child trespassers.' Pennsylvania, the jurisdiction wherein
this case arose, has adopted the Restatement theory as its law pertaining
to the liability of possessors of land for injury to child trespassers.'
While the decisions have been extending liability to new situations,
the courts have consistently required that the possessor of the land
maintain the condition which caused the death or injury before liability
will be imposed."0  Consequently, the decisive issues become first,
whether or not the possessor can be said to have maintained the con-
dition, and second, whether or not the possessor can be said to have had
sufficient knowledge that the condition was dangerous.
As to the first issue, possessors of land have been held to have
maintained a condition even when it was created by another trespasser
if the possessor, with knowledge of such acts, acquiesces in them. 11 The
Federal District Court's definition of "maintain" in the noted case1
2
seemingly states the existing law as to whether or not the possessor can
be said to have maintained the condition.
13
It is on the second issue, "knowledge," that the Court of Appeals
extends the possessor's liability.'" In 1952 the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court refused to allow recovery when the possessor had no actual
knowledge of the dangerous condition, stating that without such
6For an excellent discussion of the effect of the RESTATEMENT on the
"attractive nuisance" doctrine see, James, Tort Liability of Occupiers of Land:
Duties O'wed to Trespassers, 63 YALE L.J. 144, 164 (1953).
7PROSSER, TORTS § 76, at 440 (2d ed. 1955).
S Annot., 8 A.L.R.2d 1254 (1949). Those states are California, Minnesota,
Oregon, Pennsylvania, South Dakota, Texas, and Wisconsin.
9 Dugan v. Pennsylvania R.R., 387 Pa. 25, 127 A.2d 343 (1956); Thompson
v. Reading Co., 343 Pa. 585, 23 A.2d 729 (1942); Eldredge, Tort Liability to
Trespassers, 12 TErP. L.Q. 32 (1937).
10 Cooper v. City of Reading, 392 Pa. 452, 140 A.2d 792 (1958); Bartelson
v. Glen Alden Coal Co., 361 Pa. 519, 64 A.2d 846 (1949) ; Weimer v. Westmore-
land Water Co., 127 Pa. Super. 201, 193 At. 665 (1937).
11 Simmel v. New Jersey Coop. Co., 28 N.J. 1, 143 A.2d 521 (1958) ; Lorusso
v. DeCarlo, 48 N.J. Super. 112, 136 A.2d 900 (1957).
12 160 F. Supp. 372, 378 (E.D. Penn. 1958). "As employed in § 339 . . .
'maintain' must be construed to mean an intentional retention of an artificial
condition . . .after the possessor had actual knowledge or constructive knowledge
of its existence. Absent any expression of such intent by the possessor, there must
at least be evidence of acts or conduct of the possessor from which such an intent
may be inferred. If the only conduct relied on to support such an inference is the
possessor's inaction, then such inaction must continue for a sufficient period of
time after the possessor acquired actual or constructive knowledge of the existence
of the artificial condition to permit that inference reasonably to be drawn."
13 O'Connell v. Kansas City, 208 Mo. App. 174, 231 S.W. 1040 (1921);
Morris v. American Liability & Surety Co., 322 Pa. 91, 185 Atl. 201 (1936).
14 Supra notes 2, 10, 11, 12; 2 HARPER & JAMES, TORTS § 27.5 (1956).
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knowledge he could not have maintained the condition. 15 However, the
decision in Menneti apparently holds the possessor of the land liable
when he maintains a condition on the land which a reasonably prudent
man under like circumstances should foresee may become an unreason-
able risk to trespassing children at some future time. Thus, although
the water actually caused the death of the child, the ditch, so situated
that reasonable men could have foreseen that it would fill with water,
constituted the dangerous condition for the maintainance of which the
defendant was held liable.
This extension is in accord with the exact wording employed in
the Restatement. Section 339, clause (b), uses "should know" as the
test for whether or not the possessor has knowledge that the condition
being maintained is dangerous. Sections 12 and 334 of the Restatement
discuss the meaning of "should know" as used therein and impose a
duty of inspection on the possessor of the land to discover any changes
in the condition. 1
6
While the court does not cite any authority for this extension
and a diligent search has failed to disclose any precedent in the United
States, it is a logical continuation of the adoption of the established law
of negligence into the area of attractive nuisance; in this case, foresee-
ability.
Despite the fact that practically every American jurisdiction im-
poses some duty on the possessor of land to keep his land reasonably
safe for trespassing children,"7 Ohio courts have steadfastly refused to
recognize any phase of the attractive nuisance doctrine. In the latest
case urging the Ohio Supreme Court to overrule its prior decisions and
adopt the attractive nuisance doctrine the Court said, ". . . the infancy
of a child is not a factor . .. in conferring upon the child any greater
rights than those of a trespasser."'" Ohio does, however, distinguish
between "statical" and "active" operations, placing some burden of
care on the possessor to watch for trespassing children when an active
operation is being employed upon the land. 9 Also, the owner of a
dangerous instrumentality loses his immunity from liability when a
trespassing child is injured on such an instrumentality left unguarded
15 Rush v. Plains Township, 371 Pa. 117, 89 A.2d 200 (1952).
1 6 RESTATEMENT TORTS §§ 12(2), 334(b) (1934).
17PROSSER, TORTS § 76, at 438-9 (2d ed. 1955).
18 Signs v. Signs, 161 Ohio St. 241, 243, 118 N.E.2d 411, 412 (1954).
19 Hannan v. Ehrlich, 102 Ohio St. 176, 131 N.E. 504 (1921) (Recognized the
distinction in a dictum). Examples of "statical" conditions are turntables,
Wheeling & L. E. R.R. v. Harvey, 77 Ohio St. 235, 83 N.E. 66 (1907); and
reservoirs, Swarts v. Akron Water Works Co., 77 Ohio St. 235, 83 N.E. 66 (1907)
(Companion case to Harvey). For an example of an "active" operation see,
Ziehm v. Vale, 98 Ohio St. 306, 120 N.E. 702 (1918) (Operating an automobile) ;
also see, Case v. Miami Chevrolet Co., 38 Ohio App. 41, 175 N.E. 224 (1930)
(obiter dictum). For a more detailed review of the Ohio law in this area see,
29 OHIO JUR. Negligence §§ 55-9 (1933).
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and unlocked in a public place.2" An 1887 case seemingly applied the
doctrine, 2 ' but it was subsequently distinguished as being based upon the
children being licensees rather than trespassers. 2  Thus, only in these
limited circumstances will Ohio allow recovery by a trespassing child.
Perhaps the Ohio Supreme Court should re-examine its original basis
for repudiating the attractive nuisance doctrine, especially in view of
the acceptance of the doctrine by a vast majority of American juris-
dictions which apparently have decided that the protection of children
is of sufficient significance to override the desire for the unqualified
use of one's land. Certainly the Ohio Supreme Court has not felt
constrained in other instances to adhere to precedent when it appeared
that the basis for such precedent could no longer sustain it.23
Kenneth R. Millisor
20 The owner of a high voltage tower located on a playground was held
liable for the injury to a child who climbed to the top. Klingensmith v. Scioto
Valley Traction Co., 18 Ohio App. 290 (1924).
21 Harriman v. Pittsburgh, C. & St. L. R.R., 45 Ohio St. 11, 12 N.E. 451
(1887).
22 Wheeling & L. E. R.R. v. Harvey, 77 Ohio St. 235, 83 N.E. 66 (1907).
23 Avellone v. St. John's Hospital, 165 Ohio St. 467, 135 N.E.2d 410 (1956)
(overruled exemption from liability for negligence of charitable hospitals);
Williams v. Marion Rapid Transit, Inc., 152 Ohio St. 114, 87 N.E.2d 334 (1949)
(cause of action for injury in the womb to a viable foetus).
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